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Abstract
This essay analyses how the two medieval scholars Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī used the concept of 
ʾamān in two works of Islamic international law. ʾAmān was a concept which was used already in the 8th 
century to facilitate trade and create stable and non-violent relations between the Islamic and the non-
Islamic world. It was however constantly re-defined by the jurists through interpretation and the use of 
legal tools and reasoning.
In classical Arabic, the root to which ʾamān belongs had two meanings, one related to safety and one 
related to trust. The Arabic root system makes it possible to derive several words from one single root, 
and in the case of ʾamān and its related terms, they could theoretically be related to any one of the two 
meanings. This opens for many different interpretations of the terms and makes it difficult for modern-day
scholars to translate them with precision.
This essay argues that in classical Islamic legal terminology, the concept ʾamān was considered a 
contract between a person granting a guarantee of safety and a person seeking to be protected from harm 
when travelling. Most of the time, the jurists discuss ʾamān given by Muslims to non-Muslim travellers, 
but the reverse was possible. ʾAmān could be granted upon certain conditions, which are discussed by the 
jurists, and could be granted by any person provided they did so by free will and in the interest of Islam 
and the Islamic community.
Many of the terms related to ʾamān have been translated and explained by modern scholars. In those 
cases, the essay attempts to critically evaluate those explanations. In some cases, the findings confirm the 
previously established definition. In other cases, the results show that previous translations have been 
incorrect or lacking in detail.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Statement of purpose
Like many other linguistic studies of concepts used in politics and religion, this essay aims 
to contribute to a debate, in this case a debate on the nature of Islam. The debate on 
whether the nature of the Islamic religion is one of peace or violence has most likely been 
present since the rise of Islam in the time of its prophet Muhammad (570 - 632 A.D.). 
Some modern important additions to this highly relevant debate are Esposito & Voll 
(1996), El Fadl (2001), Moaddel & Talatoff (2000), Amanat & Griffel (2007), Kelsay & 
Turner Johnson (1991),  Al-Zuhili (2005), and An-Na'im (1987).
Despite the fact that the debate on the nature of Islam is very much alive in what is 
popularly called the Western world, many have argued that the understanding of Islam in 
general and Islamic law in particular remains mediocre in this part of the world (see e.g. 
Dawoody, 2009). The heritage of orientalism, which Edward Said so powerfully explained 
in his 1978 book Orientalism, may play a significant role in contributing to a picture of 
Islam as a religion of war and violence. 
It is possible that Western prejudice towards Islam has a disproportionately large impact 
on areas of Islamic law which are concerned with international relations, and therefore with 
questions of war and peace. One example of a frequently criticised work of Western 
scholarship on the nature of Islam as a violent entity, necessarily in opposition to a mainly 
Christian West, is Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (1996). 
Specifically, the view of Islam in the West seems to be highly influenced by notions of 
Islam as based on holy warfare and aggressive expansion (Dawoody, 2009: 4). This stands 
in direct contrast to many of the messages of its most foundational texts as well as the 
opinion of many modern Muslim scholars. Al-Zuhili (2005) has highlighted values of 
freedom, dialogue and tolerance in the Islamic message, and many others have questioned 
the view of jihad as aggressive warfare aiming to spread the Islamic religion (see An-Na'im 
1987: 325).
The aim of this study is thus to highlight one of the tools used by Muslim jurists to 
stabilise Muslim relations with non-Muslims, after the initial period of establishment of the 
Islamic religion and state, and to transform it into a state of peace and prosperity.
By doing so, we may partly disprove the generally accepted theory that jihad [in the 
meaning war] is the default state of affairs and thus refute the claim of those who think that 
by going back to Islam's basic values, Islam would be a religion of expansion through 
religious war and conversion.
1.2 Research questions
An attempt has been made to answer the following research questions:
 What was the general meaning of ʾamān at the time of the source texts?
 What is the technical meaning of ʾamān and its derivatives in the source texts?
 What was the place and function of ʾamān and its derivatives in classical Islamic 
law?
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 Has the term ʾamān and its derivatives been correctly interpreted and translated by 
modern scholars?
1.3 Materials
The text of Al-Shaybānī used is the original text of kitāb al-ʾaṣl as presented by Majid 
Khadduri in his Al-qānūn al-duwalī al-ʾislāmī (Khadduri, 1975). In the literature, Kitāb al-
ʾaṣl is sometimes referred to as kitāb al-mabsūṭ or just Al-mabsūṭ. From this book, 48 pages
(A5) of Arabic text have been selected and analysed.
From the works of Al-Sarakhsī, his commentary Šarḥ al-siyar al-kabīr has been used. 
This is a commentary on another of Al-Shaybānī's texts, al-siyar al-kabīr. From this five-
volume work, which extends over almost 1,500 pages, only some of the chapters directly 
concerning ʾamān have been analysed. This includes 74 pages of text.
It is important to note that Professor Khadduri has also published an English translation 
of Al-mabsūṭ, called The Islamic Law of Nations (Khadduri, 1966). Notwithstanding 
Khadduri's expertise in the field, the reported over-reliance on his works in previous 
research made it important to take a critical stance towards this translation. Therefore, an 
effort has been made to translate and explain Al-Shaybānī's original text in the Arabic 
language by the use of dictionaries, intra-textual clues and Al-Sarakhsī's commentary on 
the same topic. In a few cases, Khadduri's translation is referred to. Unless it is clearly sign-
posted, all translations are my own.
1.4 Methodology
The analysis is a linguistic analysis of Arabic in the language of the scholars Al-Shaybānī 
and Al-Sarakhsī in general, and of their use of the term ʾamān and its derivatives in 
particular. 
The study is based mainly on library research, i.e. books, magazine articles, and online 
sources such as Index Islamicus and the Encyclopaedia of Islam. It relies heavily on a few 
dictionaries, primarily Lisān al-ʿarab by Ibn Manẓūr (referred to as Lisān al-ʿarab) and 
Edward William Lane's 19th century dictionary of classical Arabic (referred to as Lane). 
The well-known Hans Wehr's dictionary (Cowan 1980) and Al-Mawrid (2006), which are 
both intended for translating modern Arabic, have been used as complementary translation 
tools when searches in Lane and Lisān al-ʿarab rendered no or few results.
The analysis itself is organised according to the following structure: The first section 
forms a general linguistic analysis of the root and some of its derivatives, based on 
information in and about classical Arabic lexicography. This provides the basis for further 
analysis, which attempts to elaborate on the technical meanings of the root in Al-Shaybānī's
and Al-Sarakhsī's texts. In the analysis, a combination of contextual clues and explanations 
or translations made by modern interpreters of classical Islamic international law is used.
1.5 Limitations
The study has been limited to chapters directly mentioning the concept of ʾamān or one of 
its derivatives (such as mustaʾmin or ʾāmin) in the two works of Al-Shaybānī and al-
Sarakhsī. This necessarily means that the literature surveyed is limited to only two writers, 
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belonging to the ḥanafī school of Islamic theology as it stood in the 8th century (Al-
Shaybānī) and the 11th century (Al-Sarakhsī) respectively. As will be discussed later, they 
have both had a great impact on Islamic law of international relations, but are only a 
miniscule part of the legal literature of Islam and cannot be made to represent the legal 
tradition as a whole. Any conclusions drawn can never be said to represent Islamic tradition 
or Islamic law as a whole. Nevertheless, it is my view that the opinions of these two writers 
can in some way indicate general features of Islamic law and the Arabic language of the 
time.
It is also important to note that the analysed texts almost exclusively include situations 
where ʾamān is discussed in relation to warfare or trade. One important source of potential 
errors in this essay is thus the fact that Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī may have used the 
term differently in other contexts.
Furthermore, the study leaves aside plenty of other concepts pertaining to safety, 
security, trust, confidence and other things associated with ʾamān, which may have given a 
fuller picture of Al-Shaybānī's and Al-Sarakhsī's thoughts.
1.6 Previous research
The areas of research connected to this essay are multiple, and include for instance 
international law, Islamic law, Islamic international law, war, jihad, prisoners of war, 
ḏimmiyya, Islamic human rights, legal translation and biographical research about Al-
Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī.
Majid Khadduri's War and Peace in the Law of Islam and The Islamic Law of Nations: 
Shaybānī's Siyar (in Arabic: Al-qānūn ad-duwalī al-ʾislāmī. Kitāb as-siyar liš-šaybānī) are 
some of the main sources for Western researchers on the subject of Islamic international 
law, and they have had a decisive influence over Western literature on the topic. According 
to Dawoody it is “quite easy sometimes to trace the influence of his ideas, and even his 
vocabulary, in current Western literature” (2009: 12). His texts have however not survived 
without criticism. Dawoody has said that Khadduri has neglected the diversity of the 
opinions of the classical jurists whose texts he translates, and Abu Sulayman and Zawati 
criticise him for his hostile and stereotyped conclusions on jihad (in Dawoody, 2009: 13).
1.7 Transliteration and stylistic remarks
To increase readability, Arabic words that exist in an established form in English have been 
written without phonetic markers, e.g. Islam, Sunna, Qur'an, jihad and Shari'a. Those 
without an accepted form in English are written phonetically according to the transliteration
table (section 1.7.1) and have been italicised, e.g. dār al-ʾislām.
Names of authors in Arabic are written as in the original text or, in the case of classical 
Islamic scholars, in the form which is most commonly occurring in modern literature on the
topic.
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1.7.1 Transliteration table
Consonants
ا a د d ض ḍ ك k
ب b ذ d ط ṭ ل l
ت t ر r ظ ẓ م m
ث t ز z ع ʿ ن n
ج ğ س s غ ġ ه h
ح ḥ ش š ف f و w
خ x ص ṣ ق q ي y
ء ʾ
Short vowels Long vowels Diphtongs
fatha  a ālif (ا) ā و- aw
kasra  ِ i yāʾ (ي) ī ي- ay
damma  u wāw (و) ū
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2 Context
2.1 Introduction
The following chapter will explain the system of Islamic law from its foundations and 
general characteristics to the sub-discipline which we may call Islamic international law, 
which is Al-Shaybānī's interest in his work kitāb al-ʾaṣl and which is where the technical 
aspect of the term ʾamān developed.
First, this chapter will explain the distinction between Shari'a and fiqh, notions which 
are impossible, yet for many tempting, to translate directly with one word or another into 
English. This essay makes an attempt at looking deeper than the shallow understanding of 
Shari'a as “Islamic law” and fiqh as “Islamic jurisprudence”. Secondly, an overview of the 
sources of Islamic law is given, the main message being that scholars tend to agree on what 
sources are available in the interpretation of the law but not to agree on how they are to be 
categorised or placed in a hierarchical order. A third and fourth section take a deeper look 
into the tools of Islamic law that are considered subordinate to the main sources of the 
Qur'an and Sunna, while a fifth section outlines the relationship between Islamic law and 
the Arabic language. A sixth section turns to Islamic international law, in order to explain 
its place in the system as a whole. Putting all of this together, a seventh section attempts to 
explain the roles of Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī in that system as a result of their work 
and the time in which they compiled their works on Islamic international law, as well as the 
results of the close relationship between law and language for the analysis of the terms they 
used. An eighth paragraph sums up the chapter and draws some general conclusions on Al-
Shaybānī's and Al-Sarakhsī's influence on the development of Islamic law.
In any attempt at describing Islamic law, the risk of over-simplification is ever-present. 
This is partly because of the sheer mass of legal knowledge, which is a result of more than 
1400 years of thought. Naturally, this has given rise to a multitude of interpretations. Some 
scholars have suggested that up to 500 separate schools of law, all interpreting the law 
slightly differently, developed in the early years of Islam because of its expansion (Baderin, 
2009: 189). After four centuries, this number had probably been reduced to nineteen 
separate schools (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 12). Today, there are four main Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence. 
The immense diversity is recognised and respected by Islamic scholarship by the name 
of ixtilāf, a principle signifying difference of opinion. Most Muslims, at least among 
scholars of law, tend to think of this diversity as one of the strengths of Islamic law. Abū 
Ḥanīfa, the founder of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, wrote in al-fiqh al-ʾakbar that 
"[d]ifference of opinion in the Community is a token of divine mercy" (in Kabbani, 9). This
diversity must always be kept in mind when writing and reading about Islamic law. In many
questions of law, it remains difficult to find one specific opinion or answer which is accepted
by the whole Muslim community.
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2.2 Islamic law, Shari'a and Fiqh
As highlighted above, there is a danger of over-simplification in attempting to translate the 
two terms “Shari'a” and “fiqh” into one or two words each in the English language. They 
are often, as Baderin (2009: 186) and Abdal-Haqq (1996: 5) observe, synonymously 
translated and interchangeably used as “Islamic law” even though they are different not only
linguistically but also technically. The term "Islamic law", in this paper, is used to designate
the system as a whole and thus encompasses both Shari'a and fiqh. Interestingly, Abdal-
Haqq (1996: 5) reports that the expression “al-qānūn al-ʾislāmī” has become established in 
some Arabic countries, perhaps as a result of what we may call "re-translation" from 
English to Arabic. This clearly has the potential of creating a certain amount of confusion.
Shari'a, it is reported, originally meant “the path to water”, i.e. the way to the source of 
life (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 7). Via other meanings, such as “the path to be followed” and “a 
clear way to be followed”, it has come to take on its modern, religious meaning, which can 
be expressed as “the path upon which the believer has to tread” (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 7). 
(The Qur'an itself in several places tells the believers to follow the clear and right way, e.g. 
in sura 45:18.) Baderin (2009: 186f.) explains how the term can be used to designate 
several things. One meaning is Shari'a as the ideal Islamic way of living as a whole, 
covering everything from how to greet people you meet to questions pertaining to 
pilgrimage and inheritance (Baderin, 2009: 186f.). In this sense, it “embraces all aspects of 
human activity” (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 3).
However, Shari'a can also be used to designate that part of Islamic law which is divine 
and thus unchangeable. This immutable nature of the Shari'a should be seen in contrast to 
the human understanding and interpretation of it, which is what is called fiqh. Fiqh carries 
the meaning of the root fa-qa-ha “to comprehend”, and thus could be translated as 
“comprehension” (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 11) It is a human process, marred by the potential 
errors of limited human understanding of God's intention and message. It is normally 
translated as “[Islamic] jurisprudence” (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 10). (Al-fiqh, however, with the
definite article ālif-lām, usually refers to the works of established Muslim jurists rather than
the process of analysis used to produce those works.) The goal of fiqh is to produce aḥkām 
aš-šarīʿa, or legal rulings, which can be applied to real-life situations. It follows from the 
fallibility of the process that aḥkām aš-šarīʿa should be changeable by time and 
circumstances.
2.3 Sources of Islamic law
The system of Islamic law is traditionally depicted as having two primary sources, the 
Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet, and two secondary sources called ijmāʿ and qiyās. 
(See for instance Baderin, 2009: 186.) Some scholars also include in their descriptions of 
Islamic law some or many of the legal techniques used by Muslim jurists in their 
interpretation of the four main sources, labelling them “subordinate” or “secondary” 
(Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 5). It is my aim to present a picture of Islamic law which is as diverse 
as possible, so as not to exclude techniques that may have been significant in the work of 
scholars like Al-Shaybāni and Al-Sarakhsī.
The two primary sources, the Qur'an and the Sunna, are part of what we have described 
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above as Shari'a distinct from fiqh, i.e. they are what Muslims believe to be the 
unchangeable divine message as laid down by God and his Prophet in the 7th century A.D. 
Because they are the foundation of the religion, Islamic law cannot be studied without 
reference to these two sources (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 19).
2.3.1 Qur'ān and Sunna
The Qur'an is considered by Muslims to be the actual word of Allah as revealed to the 
Prophet over a period of almost 23 years. That it is a divine text is unquestionable in 
Islamic tradition (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 19f.). All other sources of law are derived from the 
Qur'an, but the Qur'an by itself is not sufficient to understand the legal system as a whole 
(El-Awa, 1991). We must see its divine revelation as one piece of the puzzle which forms 
the complete system of Islamic law.
Because the Qur'an, despite its legal content and all-encompassing nature, does not 
directly cover all legal situations, it requires interpretation in order to form a fuctioning 
system of law. The need to interpret the Qur'an has existed since its first revelation, but 
then, the Prophet was present to provide clarification of the revelation. This is why his 
sayings, deeds and approvals of certain actions in his community is considered the second 
fundamental source in Islamic law (Baderin, 2009: 187). Even his physical attributes and 
personality traits are considered part of this source of law, which is called the Sunna of the 
Prophet (Hasan, 2000: 6). Sunna is conveyed by ḥadīṯ (pl. ʾaḥādiṯ), stories of how the 
Prophet acted or spoke in certain situations (Baderin, 2009: 188). It is important to 
distinguish between the two terms. Sunna means the "rule of law, practice, or model 
conduct ... contained in a hadīth" (Hasan, 2000: 11). Because of the hierarchy between the 
sources, most jurists agree that the Sunna never contradicts the Qur'an, only explains or 
supplements it.
It is generally accepted in the scholarly community that the Sunna was not recorded in 
writing until after the Prophet's death, perhaps because the Prophet himself forbade it in 
order to avoid confusing it with the divine message of the Qur'an (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 23). 
Instead, the ʾaḥādiṯ remained in the memories of those who had experienced them or heard 
them retold, and were transmitted between generations. When collection of the ʾaḥādiṯ 
began, the Muslim community was already widespread and divided into legal schools with 
their differences and conflicts. There is therefore a possibility that some ʾaḥādiṯ were 
fabricated during this time to support one school's interpretation over another's. It is thus 
accepted in the scholarly community, both Muslim and non-Muslim, that not every ḥadīṯ is 
authentic. Prominent scholars like Goldziher and Schacht were proponents of the stance 
that no ḥadīṯ whatsoever can be accepted as going back to the Prophet, while later scholars 
have been more accepting towards theʾaḥādiṯ. Coulson, for instance, took an approach 
where he accepted any ḥadīṯ as authentic as long as there was no evidence against its 
authenticity. (El-Awa, 1991: 154f.). The schools of jurisprudence differ much in what 
ʾaḥādiṯ they accept and in how much legal weight they afford them, but as we will see, Al-
Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī both make extensive use of ʾaḥādiṯ.
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2.3.2 Tools, methods and principles of Islamic law
The mentioned sources of Islamic law are followed in the hierarchy by several 
'supplementary' or 'secondary' sources. The ranking or acceptance of these among the 
sources of law are among the main points of difference between the Islamic schools of 
jurisprudence.
During the Prophet's lifetime, there was no need for supplementary sources because the 
Prophet was there to give a direct interpretation of the divine message whenever questions 
or new situations arose. After his death, the Muslim community found itself in need of 
methods to solve new problems and the first few centuries saw vivid activity in the field of 
Islamic law.
The Prophet had encouraged his followers to use reason in their interpretation of the 
primary sources. One example is the ḥadīṯ of Muʿāḏ bin Jabal, who before being sent by 
Muhammad to become a judge in Yemen asked the Prophet how to judge in his new role in
the absence of the Prophet's guidance. The Prophet approved Muʿāḏ's methodology, which 
included using the Qur'an, the Sunna and his own reason, in that order (Bassiouni and Badr,
2002: 5, Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 30). Individual reasoning in this form is often referred to as 
ijtihād, literally 'exerting oneself' (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 10). The immediate successors of the
Prophet continued this practice. There is, for instance, a Qur'anic provision under which 
booty obtained by Muslim fighters is to be shared with nomadic tribes who have not 
adopted Islam. During the emergence of the Islamic state on the Arabian peninsula, this 
rule was followed rigourously, as the neutrality of some powerful tribes was crucial to the 
safety of the Muslims. Later, when the power of the Islamic state over the land increased, 
the first caliph, Abu Bakr, re-interpreted this provision in light of the changing 
circumstances and chose not to pay any of the booty to such tribes as the rationale for doing
so had disappeared (Bassiouni and Badr, 2002: 5). This shows that reason and 
interpretation were part and parcel of the law already in the earliest years of Islam.
In the three centuries directly after the death of the Prophet, legal activity flourished in 
the Islamic world, mainly in the two centres Kūfa and Baṣra in modern-day Iraq. In the 10th
century A.D., however, this activity seems to have decreased. There appears to be a 
consensus among scholars that jurists of that time actually thought that all legal questions 
had been exhaustively solved (Hallaq, 1984). It is a classic question among scholars of 
Islamic law whether this signifies that legal activity ought to have stopped – and did stop – 
after that generation of scholars, giving way to an era of taqlīd, 'rigid conformity' or 'blind 
following' (Abdal-Haqq 1996: 37). The scholars, according to this view, shifted from 
individual reasoning to conforming to the books of fiqh which had been written in the first 
few centuries of Islamic thought.
The issue of whether the so called 'gate of ijtihād' was closed or kept open, i.e. whether 
jurists were allowed to continue using their individual reasoning in finding solutions to legal 
problems or were forced to continue along the lines of their predecessors, continues to be 
of immense importance today. Muhammad Iqbal, one of the most important reformative 
scholars of the 20th century, has said that the closing of the gate of ijtihād is “pure fiction” 
which resulted in “a state of immobility” in Islamic jurisprudence and that modern scholars 
were never bound by the rulings of their predecessors (Iqbal, 1951: 148). Hallaq (1984) has
shown that the gate was not closed in either theory or in practice, mentioning important 
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scholars such as Al-Ghazali as examples of proponents of ijtihād and innovative reasoning 
even after the alleged closing of the gate of ijtihād.
The Islamic legal institution of ijmāʿ, or consensus to resolve a legal matter, crystallised 
from a ḥadīṯ reporting the Prophet saying that “my community shall never agree on an 
error” (Baderin, 2009: 188). Generally, the schools of Islamic jurisprudence rank ijmāʿ high
among the legal sources supplementary to the Qur'an and Sunna, so that a ruling by ijmāʿ is 
as authoritative as a ruling of the Sunna or a legal injunction in the Qur'an. 
Ijmāʿ, however, remains problematic. For instance, scholars differ in their opinion of 
who is permitted to participate in forming consensus – only the religious experts or all 
Muslims, including women – and whether consensus has to be unanimous to be valid 
(Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 31). Despite its ambiguities, ijmāʿ has been the focus of efforts among 
some scholars in establishing democratic institutions in the Islamic world.
Qiyās, or analogy, is the term for extending a rule in the Qur'an or Sunna to a new 
situation based on a logical similarity of the situation, or of the rationale of the rule, with a 
novel situation (Baderin, 2009: 188). Some find support for the use of qiyās in the Qur'an 
59:2, where the Muslim community is asked by Allah to infer analogically from the 
example of the treacherous members of the Banū Nadir tribe. A common example of 
modern-day qiyās is how narcotics have been prohibited by use of analogy with the 
prohibition of alcohol in verse 5:90. Qiyās is recognised by all four sunni schools of 
jurisprudence as a legitimate tool of law, but it is ranked lower than a ruling by ijmāʿ, since 
it involves only one person and not a larger body of people (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 33).
In all legal systems, there is sometimes a need of avoiding the result that a literal 
application of a legal rule might lead to. In Islam, this together with the emergence of 
differences between scholars and schools of jurisprudence, created a need to ensure that the
application of legal provisions was logical and fair (Baderin, 2009: 189). For this, several 
legal tools were devised by the jurists, sometimes based on pre-Islamic legal techniques 
which had been preserved and used in the communities (Coulson, 1969: 4). Among the 
most important are maṣlaḥa, or consideration of public welfare or larger interest, and 
istiḥsān, juristic preference in a given case (Bassiouni and Badr, 2002: 1). They refer to 
processes of choosing alternative solutions or rules, even if they are technically weaker (e.g.
based on a ḥadīṯ of weaker grade) than other interpretations in order to foster common 
welfare or do what is fair and equitable (Abdal-Haqq, 1996: 33). Sometimes, the choice 
between different legal solutions may take place between the schools, so that a judge in a 
specific case may find it more equitable to apply a rule from another school of law than his 
own. This is called taxayyur, or 'eclectic choice'.
There is also a recognition that local custom or customary law (ʿurf) may play a role in 
the law where there is no established rule of law or room for interpretation. This has 
become important in the Hanafi school, to which Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī belong 
(Habachy, 1962: 471).
The following excerpt from Al-Sarakhsī's commentary provides an example of how 
some of the legal tools mentioned above were used. It occurs in a discussion of who is to be
given the protection of an ʾamān when the head of the household or another family member
has asked the Muslims for protection:
هلهأو هتأرما هدلوو نيذلا اوناك يف هلايع نم راغصلا رابكلاو نم ءاسنلا ،لاجرلاو يفو سايقلا
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هتجوز :هلهأ ،طقف هنل يف فرعلا لاقي نمل هل ةجوز لهأتم نملو ل ةجوز هل ريغ ،لهأتم
نإو ناك هلوقي ،ةعامج هنكلو نسحتسا مسا :لاقف لهلا لوانتي لك نم هلوعي لجرلا يف
هراد قفنيو ،هيلع لأ ىرت يف هلوق ـ ىلاعت ـ يف ةصق حون هيلع ينإ> :ملسلا ينبا نم
نوه <يلهأ ةيلا  ]٤٠دقو [ ىنثتسا هللا ةجوزلا نع لهلا يف ةصق طول هيلع ملسلا لاق ـ
ىلاعت ـ هانيجنأف> : هلهأو لإ  :لمنلا] <هتارمأ٥٧،[ يفو ةصق انلق> :حون لمحا اهيف نم لك
نيجوز كلهأو لإ نم قبس هيلع  :دوه]  <لوقلا٤٥ينعي [ ،هتجوز انفرعف نأ مسا لهلا
لوانتي ريغ ةجوزلا نلف :لاقيو ريثك اذإ :لهلا ناك قفني ىلع ةعامج اذهو نل نيب لهلا
لايعلاو ةاواسم يف لامعتسلا اا فرع
(Al-Sarakhsī, 218f.)
His family is his wife and his child who were sustained by him, both young 
and old and both male and female, and by analogy (qiyās) his family is: 
only his wife, because in customary law (ʿurf) it is said that the person who 
has a wife is married and the person who does not is unmarried, and so 
they said collectively, but he [most likely, this refers to Al-Shaybānī] chose 
the preferable option (istaḥsana) and said: the name of the family 
comprises all whom the man supports in his household and provides for, do
you not see that in His – the Exalted's – speech in the story of Noah, peace 
be upon him: <Indeed my son is one of my family> Hūd verse [40] and 
Allah has excluded the wife from the family in the story of Lūṭ, peace be 
upon him, when He – the Exalted – said: <So We saved him and his family
except for his wife> [An-Naḥl (sic)1: 57], and in the story of Noah: <We 
said, load upon the ship of each creature two mates and your family, except
those about whom the word has preceded> [Hūd: 45] that is his wife, and 
so we knew that the family name excludes the wife and so it is said: a 
person who has a large family [is]: if he provides for all of them and this is 
because in customary law (ʿurf) the family and the people of the household 
are considered equal (My translation, Qur'anic verses following the 
translation by Sahih International).
This example shows how legal scholars of the time used their reasoning to reach a legal 
result they considered suitable through a discussion of sources and tools. In this case, Al-
Sarakhsi draws his conclusions from verses in the Qur'an, customary law (ʿurf), as well as 
opinions of Al-Shaybānī and the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which in themselves are 
results of analogical reasoning (qiyās) and juristic preference (istiḥsān). Clearly, the law 
during this time was not set in stone but rather a result of constant re-interpretation.
2.3.3 Contracts in Islamic law
Without doubt, contracts in some forms are the basis of any prospering economic system. 
On a market where contracts are not respected, traders cannot trust that they will be paid 
for their goods and no trading will take place. It is well-known, writes Bonner (2001: 412) 
"that the early Islamic period was an age of economic expansion, in which markets and 
1 Here, both consulted versions of Al-Sarakhsī's book refer to the verse An-Naḥl (verse 16),
when in fact the quoted ʾāya is part of the verse An-Naml (verse 27).
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production flourished across a larger unified economic space than had ever existed before." 
The Arab peoples at the time of the Prophet relied for their substinence on the caravan 
trade on the Arab peninsula, and the Prophet himself took part in many trading journeys. It
is natural, therefore, that the sanctity of contracts should be an important part of Islamic 
law. 
Al-Habachy (1962: 459) has stated that a primary rule of Islamic law is that any 
agreement between people is valid and binding unless it contradicts a specific prohibition in 
the Shari'a. The most basic rule relating to this is the Qurʾan 5: 1: "0 ye who believe! Fulfil 
(all) obligations". The rule that "Muslims are bound by their stipulations" (Al-muslimūn 
ʿinda šurūṭihim) and that 'the contract is the Shari'a of the contracting parties' (Al-ʿaqd 
sharīʿatu l-mutaʿāqidīn) are "unanimously recognised in all schools of Muslim law" 
(Habachy, 1962: 459 and 465). That Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī were equally aware of 
the sanctity of contracts is clear from the following excerpt from šarḥ al-siyar al-kabīr:
لاقف هيلع " :نوملسملا ملسلا دنع "، مهطورش لاقو رمع يضر هللا هنع طرشلا ،كلمأ :يأ
بجي ءافولا هب
(Al-Sarakhsī, 195)
He (the Prophet Muhammad) said, peace be upon him: “Muslims [stand 
by] their stipulations”, and Umar said, may God be pleased with him, “the 
stipulation is expected of you”, that is: its fulfilment is required.
Some scholars have even posited that the Shari'a itself is a kind of contract between 
Allah and man and there are several verses in the Qur'an which indicate that God has made 
a promise to the believers (Habachy, 1962: 460, see e.g. Qur'an 13: 31 and 14: 47). 
Similarly, the relationship between the ruler of the Muslim community and his subjects is 
traditionally considered to be a contract, whose respective obligations had to be honoured 
equally by both citizens and ruler (Habachy, 1962: 463). The sanctity of contracts was to be
equally respected even where the parties were non-Muslims, as the agreement was still 
considered to have been made with Allah as its witness (Habachy, 1962: 460 and 466).
2.4 Islamic law and the Arabic language
The relationship between law and language is an important one in all legal systems. To 
think that Arabic is less clear or precise than other languages with legal terminology would 
be a misconception, as Bernard Lewis (1977: 45) has shown. In fact, legal Arabic has been 
characterised by precision throughout Islamic history (Lewis, 1977: 45).
Islam and Arabic have always been closely connected, because Arabic is the language of 
the Qur'an and of the Prophet. Many Muslims consider Arabic the only language in which 
the Qur'an can be rightly reproduced. Despite this, Carter (2007: 26) has argued that it was 
clear to the Muslim community from the beginning that the religious truths had been 
revealed to them not in a divine tongue but in the human language of the time. Therefore, 
the same need of interpreting the legal injunctions of the Qur'an which led to the creation 
of fiqh also led to the construction of elaborate theories of grammar, or tafsīr, 
'interpretation'. Carter (2007: 26) reports that the first Islamic jurist to afford proper weight 
to the importance of language to the law was Al-Shāfi'ī, the scholar who is regarded as 
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having mediated most between the schools of fiqh, contributing to a unification of Islamic 
law in the 8th and 9th centuries AD and founding the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence. Since 
then, Carter argues that the two sciences of grammar and law were mutually reinforcing so 
that “advances in one made further progress possible in the other” (Carter, 2007: 25). First 
in modern times have scholars moved away from the norm that knowledge of the Arabic 
language and its grammar is a prerequisite to become a scholar of Islamic law (Abdal-
Haqq, 1996: 27).
Because of the close relationship between law and language, linguists have found not 
only that language changes depending on what legal norms are expressed, but also the 
extent to which legal norms can be affected by language (Edzard, 1997: 69). One example, 
taken from the realm of international relations, is that of the term ṣulḥ, which, although 
rarely used, is sometimes translated as 'treaty'. The Arabic word ṣulḥ, however, is 
problematic in this context because one of the most important instances of its use is the so 
called treaty of Hudaybiyya, concluded between the two cities Mecca and Medina during 
the Prophet's stay in the latter. The peace treaty was restricted in time to ten years (but was 
considered broken after only two years following an attack by a Mecca-aligned clan on 
allies of Medina) (Bsoul, 2008: 108). Some scholars have set even lower time-limits to such
a treaty (Holt, 1980: 67). It is possible that this has led the term ṣulḥ to become charged 
with notions of time limitation. Edzard (1997: 81) finds that the treaty of Hudaybiyya is 
considered the source for the 'ten year rule', i.e. a rule defining peace with non-Muslims as 
only temporary. This may have significant consequences for international co-operation and 
lead to misinterpretation of modern international agreements.
One problem for translators of classical Arabic legal language is the lack of tools to 
interpret the highly technical and specialised language used by scholars like Al-Shaybānī. 
There is, as Lewis (1977) says, no adequate historical dictionary of classical Arabic as it 
was used at that time. This is for three reasons. First, some dictionaries aiming to reflect 
classical Arabic were compiled by scholars more than thousand years ago and are thus not 
always suited for modern research. Second, even those scholars aimed to explain the 
meaning that words had before their time, not the meaning which was in use at the time of 
compilation of the dictionaries, and so both meaning and legal-social context had changed. 
Therefore, many dictionaries are replete with errors. Third, most dictionaries focused on 
poetry and literature, and so explanations of legal language are rare and may not recognise 
the legal-technical meaning of a given term (Lewis, 1977: 45).
2.5 Islamic international law
2.5.1 Introduction
Already in the Prophet's time, the newly founded Muslim community had interactions, 
both peaceful and non-peaceful, with other groups. Islamic international law as a legal 
discipline thus developed out of these interactions; to deal with the problem of "how to 
conduct relations with non-Islamic states and with the religious communities within its own 
territory” (Khadduri, 1966: 3). As such, it deals in great detail with questions of war and 
peace, territory, captured persons and their property. These issues are however rooted in 
more general legal questions, for instance questions of property rights and choice of law. 
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Therefore, despite its specialised concern, Islamic international law was driven by similar 
developing mechanisms as the body of fiqh in general, to which it is normally considered to 
belong as a sub-discipline rather than a separate field (Bassiouni and Badr, 2002: 2, Abdal-
Haqq, 1996: 40). This also means that Islamic international law may be considered binding 
upon all Muslims to the same extent as, for instance, Islamic rules for marriage or 
inheritance (Khadduri, 1966: 6, Bsoul, 2008: 12).
2.5.2 Islamic international law – siyar
The most common denomination in Arabic for the field of Islamic international law is 
siyar, plural of the word sīra. Sīra occurs in the Qur'an in six verses and is interpreted by 
Khadduri (1966: 39) to mean 'travel', 'to move', or 'form'. Other non-technical, non-legal 
meanings are 'path' or 'way of walking'. In a more specific sense, it was also used early on 
to denote a life or a biography. Ibn Ishāq, the famous biographer of the Prophet, wrote the 
first work of sīra and thereafter, most scholars have used the term to denote the life of the 
Prophet (Bsoul, 2008: 1). Its plural later came to mean the conduct or behaviour of a whole
community.
Al-Shaybānī never defined the term siyar in his text but Al-Sarakhsī chose to do so in 
the following way. This particular translation is from Khadduri (1966: 40):
The siyar is the plural of sīra and this book is called after this term. It 
describes the conduct of the believers in their relations with the unbelievers
of enemy territory as well as with the people with whom the believers had 
made treaties, who may have been temporarily (musta'mins) or 
permanently (Dhimmīs) in Islamic lands; with apostates, who were the 
worst of the unbelievers, since they abjured after they accepted [Islam]; and
with rebels (baghīs), who were not counted as unbelievers, though they 
were ignorant and their understanding [of Islam] was false.
It is important to remember that there is no indication that classical jurists viewed rules 
pertaining to inter-community affairs differently from other rules. It seems correct to see 
siyar as the works in which a certain category of rules, namely those pertaining to inter-
community affairs, were discussed, and not as those rules per se (see e.g. El-Bakry, 1987: 
115). As we have seen, there is no natural distinction within the body of rules itself, as they 
arose from the same sources of law and plenty of jurists did not see them as separate from 
the rules governing relations within the Muslim community.
Like the general fiqh, many foundational concepts and norms of siyar are found in the 
Qur'ān. The relationship between Muslims and non-muslims, for instance, became partly 
defined upon revelation of verse 9:2-14, where treaties with other peoples are discussed. 
One may also point to verse 5:1, which calls on the believers to fulfil their contractual 
obligations. Nevertheless, the importance of the Sunna as a source of Islamic international 
law is immense. It was through the Prophet's conduct as a leader and statesman, making 
decisions on behalf of his state, that this law crystallised (Bsoul, 2008: 12).
2.5.3 The division of the world in classical Islamic law
The political circumstances of Islam's early years dictated that the field of siyar should 
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become during this period to a large extent concerned with issues related to warfare. 
Therefore, the laws of war became a central topic of study for the jurists (Khadduri, 1966: 
5). This is clearly reflected in the way in which they divided the world into territories. The 
Hanafi school, which rose to prominence under the Abbasids and Ottomans, devised the 
terms dār al-ʾislām (literally: 'realm/house of Islam”' sometimes also seen as a kind of “Pax
Islamica” [Khadduri, 1966: 11]) and dār al-ḥarb (literally: 'realm of war'), the territories 
where Muslim law was not enforced (Abel, 2013). This division of the world into territories
created a dichotomy between “two necessarily and perpetually hostile domains” (Holt, 
1980: 67). This dichotomy, despite being based on war, does not mean that actual hostilities
were ever-present, necessary or even frequent. Instead, one might see it, as does Professor 
Khadduri (1966: 14) as a rough equivalent to the modern concept of non-recognition.
It was first more than 400 years after Al-Shaybānī's death that prominent scholars began 
disassembling these territorial categories, recognising that the accepted terms did not cover 
the immense diversity of relations within and without the Islamic communities. 
Nevertheless, it was only in the 16th century that the majority of the scholarly community 
departed from the view that the basis for outside relations was one of war, perhaps 
interrupted by periods of intermittent peace. Instead, they advocated permanent peace 
(Khadduri, 1966: 22; El-Bakry, 1987: 119). In modern times, the division has been 
fervently criticised by some scholars, mostly on the basis of it being an innovation, lacking 
support in the foundational sources of Islamic law. Al-Zuhili (2005: 278) has written that it 
is merely "a transient description of what happens when war flares up between Muslims and
others. It is a narration of facts, similar to those confirmed by scholars of international law, 
namely that war splits the international community into two parties". Other jurists regard it 
as founded on a misconception of jihad as an aggressive kind of war against unbelievers 
(El-Bakry, 1987: 87). Nevertheless, the division into territories is alive in the Muslim 
community. Chinese Muslims, for instance, have been reported to consider themselves 
inhabitants of dār al-ḥarb (An-Na'im, 1987: 317).
2.5.4 Legal tools to decrease hostility
Despite consensus among classical legal scholars that the division between dār al-Islām and 
other territories existed, practical concerns made constant warfare with the outside world 
impossible and therefore, several legal mechanisms were used by the Muslims to manage 
their relations with non-Muslims. Some of the most important ones were agreements, truces
or pacts (muʿāhada, ṣulḥ, ʿahd) and the acceptance of non-believers in Islamic lands under 
the label ḏimmī. This essay also argues that ʾamān, i.e. a granting of a temporary guarantee 
of security, was one such tool.
The Muslims entered into agreements with other communities ever since the time of the 
Prophet (Khadduri, 1966: 10). For instance, after the revelation of the Qur'anic verse which
ordered that jizya, a form of tax, should be collected from non-muslims living in Muslim 
territory (verse 9: 29) he collected jizya from the Christians of Najran and the Jews of 
Yemen but not from the Jewish tribe at Khaybar. This was because he had already 
concluded a treaty with the Khaybar tribe (Bsoul, 2008: 43). This shows that Islamic law 
affords great importance to pacts, contracts and treaties in an international context. 
The Shafi'i school of law proposed a third territorial concept, dār al-ʿahd or dār al-ṣulḥ 
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(literally: “realm of truce”) to denote the territories whose inhabitants had concluded a 
peace treaty with the Muslims and paid tribute (Khadduri, 1966: 13; El-Bakry, 1987: 128). 
Al-Shaybānī, despite being a follower of the Hanafi school of law, used and described all 
three terms extensively (Bsoul, 2008: 13, Edzard, 1997: 71).
2.6 Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī in Islamic international law
2.6.1 Al-Shaybānī
This section aims to put Al-Shaybānī in relation to the topics which have been discussed 
above. Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥasan Al-Shaybānī, as his full name was, was born in 749 or 
750 A.D. in Wasit  in modern Iraq (Salaymeh, 2008: 522, El-Bakry, 1987: 117). He was 
brought up in Kufa, also in Iraq (El-Bakry, 1987: 117). He seems to have been a talented 
student and quickly ended up studying with some of the most important Islamic scholars of 
the time, notably Abū Ḥanifa  (699-767 A.D.) and his disciple Abū Yūsuf (d. 768 A.D.), 
but also the founders of the Awza'i and the Maliki schools of jurisprudence, who were 
active in Medina (El-Bakry, 1987: 117f.). The substance of Al-Shaybānī's texts are 
however most likely to reflect opinions held by the founding figures of the Hanafi school of 
law (Salaymeh, 2008: 530).
Al-Shaybānī died in 804 or 805 A.D., after having spent several years as qāḍī (judge) of 
Raqqa in Syria under the caliph Harun al-Rashid (Salaymeh, 2008: 522). He was dismissed 
from his position, which was probably a position to which respect and authority was 
attached, only a year or two before his death. The reason for his dismissal seems to have 
been the caliph's dissatisfaction with a legal opinion issued by Al-Shaybānī over an ʾamān 
issued by the caliph to a zaydi Imam. The caliph eventually sought to ignore the ʾamān and 
declared it invalid, which Al-Shaybānī refused to accept (Khadduri, 1966: 33). Not only 
does this show the famous vulnerability of classical Islamic judges to their rulers (see e.g. 
Coulson 1956), but also, most importantly, that the ʾamān was a legal tool which was used 
in the real world during Al-Shaybānī's lifetime.
Al-Shaybānī's relationship to his teacher Abū Yūsuf, although sometimes strained, was 
also one of respect, which could explain why many of Al-Shaybānī's early works are 
thought to be mere recorded opinions, most likely Abū Ḥanīfa's, as dictated by Abū Yūsuf 
(Khadduri, 1966: 37). Other books, called the kabīr books, were written by Al-Shaybānī 
himself but have been lost over the years and are known in substance only through other 
works, such as the commentary (šarḥ) by Al-Sarakhsī which is analysed in this essay. It 
does not reproduce the original text by Al-Shaybānī—perhaps because Al-Sarakhsī was in 
prison at the time of compiling his commentary and so was writing from memory 
(Khadduri, 1966: 38ff.). Kitāb al-ʾaṣl, the source material used in this dissertation, 
therefore, is the only original Al-Shaybānī text thought to be still in existence. It also goes 
under the label kitāb al-mabsūṭ.
Al-Shaybānī also wrote kitāb al-kasb, 'the book of acquisition', where he discusses the 
advantages and vices of commerce and recommends not accumulating wealth beyond one's 
basic needs (Bonner, 2001: 411). According to Bonner (2001), it is almost certain that this 
book has been significantly altered by other authors who have made commentaries on it. 
Perhaps there is a risk that the same applies to his works of siyar.
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Even though other early jurists, such as Said bin Jubayr (665-714 A.D.) and Hasan al-
Basrī (642-728 A.D.), wrote on similar questions, it is thought that none had written texts 
especially on the siyar before Al-Shaybānī (Salaymeh, 2008: 528). Al-Shaybānī was also, as
Bsoul (2008: 170) highlights, a skilful jurist in combining the approaches of the legal 
schools of Medina and Kufa, which contributed to his status as a scholar. This, we must 
remember, took place before the alleged closing of the gate of ijtihād, and so his opinions 
may have been criticised by other scholars but not,  his right to express them. Therefore, 
Al-Shaybānī's opinions have become respected and authoritative in modern times, so that 
they often are cited in modern-day fatwas (Arabic: fatwā pl. fatāwā, a formal legal opinion 
issued by a scholar, a so called mufti, to muslims seeking advice).
Al-Shaybānī's style in kitāb al-ʾaṣl is one Khadduri (1966) likens to a 'case method' 
which uses dialogue to discuss different scenarios. He does not always provide a precedent 
or legal opinion in order to legitimise his own opinion, which, as Salaymeh (2008: 530) 
points out, reminds us of the style of earlier scholars such as Abū Ḥanīfa, to whom ra'y 
(considered opinion) and ijtihād were certainly more important than following ḥadīṯ. 
However, Al-Shaybānī's work shows a larger consideration of the traditions than his 
predecessors of the Hanafi school.
2.6.2 Al-Sarakhsī
Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Abī Sahl Abū Bakr Al-Sarakhsī, as his full name was, was also
a follower of the Hanafi school of law. He lived and worked in 11th century central Asia, 
but no exact dates of his birth and death are known to biographers. He was influenced not 
only by his own school of jurisprudence but also by the customs and traditions of the region
(Calder, 2011). Some of his works seem to have been motivated by antagonism towards the
Karrāmiyya movement, which gained force in Transoxiania at that time (Bonner, 2001: 
415). Little is known of Al-Sarakhsī's life but some of his works have been preserved, most
important of which are the Mabsūṭ, the Šarḥ al-Siyar al-kabīr and the ʾUṣūl al-fiqh. There 
are indications in the Mabsūṭ that Al-Sarakhsī dictated it to some of his students from a 
prison cell, but the reason for his imprisonment is not clear (Calder, 2011).
In the Šarḥ al-Siyar al-kabīr Al-Sarakhsī not only reproduced and reorganised texts of 
Al-Shaybānī, but also provided an extensive commentary concentrated upon questions of 
ixtilāf, difference of opinion between the jurists. In doing so, he also included plenty of 
information about local practices and opinions from other Islamic schools of jurisprudence. 
His achievements as a jurist earned him the name Šams al-ʾaʾimma (lit. "sun of the 
leaders") (Calder, 2011). As Calder points out, his texts, not least the Šarḥ al-Siyar al-
kabīr, "remained a point of reference for the developing Hanafi furūʿ tradition till the 19th 
century" (Calder, 2011).
It is true for all of Sarakhsī's commentaries that it is not an easy task to distinguish 
where the original opinion ends and Sarakhsī's commentary begins (Bonner, 2001: 413). 
Unlike Al-Shaybānī, he did not use dialogue but instead referred to scholars, authorities and
sources in flowing text, making his text considerably harder to read than Al-Shaybānī's. 
Some indications that the opinion is Al-Shaybānī's have however been found. Some 
examples of these are: 
1. where a sentence begins qāl, 'he said',
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2. when the name Muḥammad is mentioned, as this refers to Al-Shaybānī's full name, 
Muḥammad Ibn Al-Ḥasan Al-Shaybānī,
3. when a verb such as 'he said', 'he added' or 'he commented', or a verbal noun related to 
them, is combined with the formulas raḍiya Allāhu ʿanhu ('May God be pleased with him') 
or raḥimahu llāh (may God have mercy upon him), unless it is clear that Al-Sarakhsī is 
referring to someone other than Al-Shaybānī, such as one of the companions of the 
Prophet. When such a verb is followed by ṣallā llāh ʿalayhi wa sullam 'peace be upon him' 
(pbuh), it is taken to mean that Al-Sarakhsī is referring to the Prophet.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Introduction
ʾAmān and terms related to it are among the most central and most common of the terms 
discussed in Al-Sarakhsī's and Al-Shaybānī's texts; of the 226 chapters of Al-Sarakhsī's 
extensive commentary, about 13 % focus directly on the concept of ʾamān, and many 
others discuss it indirectly. 
That ʾamān is a difficult topic, full of intricate details, is indicated by both Al-Shaybānī 
and Al-Sarakhsī. In al-siyar al-kabīr, as Al-Sarakhsī quotes Al-Shaybānī:
ناملا باوبأ يف اهفطلأو باتكلا اذه لئاسم قدأ نأب ملعا
(Al-Shaybānī in Al-Sarakhsī, 175)
Know that the finest and most intellectually refined problems of this book 
are [to be found] in the chapters on ʾamān.
Adding to this, Al-Sarakhsī himself wrote:
نمو ,ةلصلا باتك نم ناذلا بابب هيلعف انباحصأ نم ةياورلا ظافح ناحتما دارأ نم :ليقو
يف نيرحبتملا ناحتما دارأ نمو ,عماجلا ناميأب هيلعف هقفلا يف نيرحبتملا ناحتما دارأ
ريسلا نامأب هيلعف هقفلاو وحنلا
(Al-Sarakhsī, 175)
It is said: the one who seeks to test [his skill in] the memorisation of 
narration from our companions must [study] the chapter of announcement 
in the book of prayer, and the one who seeks to test [his skill] as an expert 
of jurisprudence must [study] the faith of the mosque, and the one who 
seeks to test [his skill] as an expert of [both] grammar and jurisprudence 
must [study] the ʾamān of the siyar.
Despite its common appearance in the texts, translators rarely investigate the actual 
meaning of this root and it is common to see the terms derived from it transcribed but not 
translated. Khadduri, for instance, has chosen not to translate many of the derivatives of the
root ʾa-ma-na, instead relying throughout his English translation of Al-Shaybānī on the 
reader having observed the following explanation from the introductory chapter to his book:
He [the enemy, ḥarbī] could attain a state of temporary peace by means of 
an amān (safe-conduct), which he could obtain from an official or from a 
private person before entering Islamic lands and becoming a musta’min. 
The musta’min enjoys a status of temporary peace for a period not 
exceeding one year, while in the dār al-Islām. (Khadduri, 1966: 47)
When Khadduri does translate the term he chooses “pledge of security” or “safe-conduct”.
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3.2 The general meaning of the root a-ma-naʾ
3.2.1 Introduction
There seems to be three different patterns of vocalization of the root ʾa-ma-na in verb form
I (faʿala), as Al-Mawrid (2006) mentions ʾamuna, ʾamana and ʾamina. Wehr's dictionary 
(Cowan 1980) does not include ʾamina, while Lane's leaves out ʾamuna. In Al-Mawrid, 
ʾamana is said to mean “to trust in” (waṯiqa bi), ʾamuna “to be or become faithful, loyal, 
reliable, trustworthy, honest” and ʾamina “to be (become, feel) safe, secure, peaceful”. 
Similarly, Wehr writes that ʾamuna means “to be faithful, reliable, trustworthy”, and ʾamina
“to be safe, feel safe”. Al-Muḥīṭ (Entry: ʾa-ma-na) explains one meaning as “against fear” 
(ḍidd al-xawf) and one as “against treachery” (ḍidd al-xiyāna). Lane (entry: ʾamina) does 
not distinguish between the vocalisation patterns but does explain both meanings. From the 
dictionaries, we may discern that the root ʾa-ma-na carries one meaning related to trust and
one related to safety. The meanings are related and may of course overlap, but it may be 
beneficial to discuss them separately. 
The fact that the root ʾa-ma-na carries two distinguishable meanings may have 
consequences for the analysis of many of the words derived from this root. Often, the logic 
of the Arabic root system makes it possible to discover the meaning of a word by the form 
which it takes. For instance, one may say that generally, the form mafʿūl is a passive 
participle of the first form of the root, and so usually means “the one to whom the act of the
verb is done”. When the root has different meanings related to different vocalisation 
patterns, however, it becomes impossible to say from which of the patterns a particular 
word has been derived. The mentioned passive participle may in that case carry with it any 
(or all) of the meanings from the different patterns. In the case of ʾa-ma-na, this makes it 
difficult to know simply from knowledge of the Arabic root system which meaning a 
derived term has.
3.2.3 a-ma-naʾ  related to trust and confidence
Both ʾamuna and ʾamina, Lane says, signify that “[h]e was, or became, trusted in, or 
confided in … or he was, or became, trusty, trustworthy, trustful, confidential, or faithful”. 
Lane further explains that the verbs ʾamina (ن م ِ أ), ʾāmana (نمآ), ʾammana (نمم أ), iʾtamana (
نمتئا, also ittamana نمتم ا and ītamana نمتيا) and istaʾmana (نمأتسس ا) are transitive verbs 
which signify “[h]e trusted, or confided, in him; he entrusted him with, or confided to him, 
power, authority, control, or a charge; he gave him charge over a thing or person” (Lane, 
entry: ʾa-ma-na). Some of them may also take the preposition bi (ب ِ ), similar to the English
“to trust in”.
Form VIII, iʾtamana (نمتئا), also occurs in the passive, such as in “uʾtumina fulān” (
نلف نمتؤا), which, according to Lane, means that “[s]uch a one was trusted, or confided, 
in”. The same form may also take the preposition ʿalā (ىلع) and thus form iʾtamanahu 
ʿalayhi (هيلع نمتئا), which means “[h]e trusted, or confided, in him with respect to such a 
thing; he entrusted him with, or confided to him, power, authority, control, or a charge over 
it … he made him, or took him as [ʾamīn] نيمأ over such a thing” (Lane, entry: ʾa-ma-na).
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3.2.4 a-ma-naʾ  related to safety and security
Lane describes the meaning of the verb ʾamina as “He was, or became, or felt, secure, safe, 
or in a state of security or safety; originally, he was, or became, quiet, or tranquil, in heart, 
or mind … he was, or became, secure, or free from fear … he was, or became, or felt, free 
from expectation of evil, or of an object of dislike or hatred, in the coming time; originally, 
he was, or became, easy in mind, and free from fear” (Lane, entry: ʾamina). Lane's 
explanation is in accordance with (if not completely copied from) Lisān al-ʿarab (entry: ʾa-
ma-na). The verb is transitive in itself and through the preposition min.
The safety-related meaning of the root ʾa-ma-na can also be found in the Qur'an (9:6): 
ال  مم وس ق  مس ه نم أ ب ِ  ك ل ِ ذ ذ   ه ن م أس م  ه غس ل ِ بس أ  مم ث  ه ِ لم لا م ال ك  ع م سس ي  ىذ تم ح  ه رس ج ِ أ ف  ك ر اج ت سس ا ن يك ِ ر ِ شس م لس ا ن م ِ  دم ح أ  نس إ ِ و 
ن وم ل عس ي 
And if any one of the polytheists seeks your protection (istajāraka), then 
grant him protection (ʾajirhu) so that he may hear the words of Allah. Then
deliver him to his place of safety (maʾman). That is because they are a 
people who do not know. (Translation: Sahih International)
The 'place of safety' is the word maʾman, which is derived from the root ʾa-ma-na.
3.3 The legal-technical meaning of a-ma-naʾ  in the siyar
3.3.1 Introduction
We have seen that Khadduri considers ʾamān “a state of temporary peace, valid for one 
year, which can be given by either an official or a private person, which applies in dār al-
Islām and is possible to translate with the English word safe-conduct” (Khadduri, 1966: 47, 
my emphasis). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, safe-conduct is “[t]he privilege,
granted by a monarch or other authority, of being protected from arrest or harm while 
making a particular journey or travelling within a certain region” (OED, entry: safe-
conduct). Occasionally, Khadduri also translates ʾamān with “pledge of security” 
(Khadduri, 1966: 193). This is a view of ʾamān which he shares with many other prominent
scholars of Islam (e.g. An-Na'im 1987, El-Bakry 1987). The mustaʾmin, he says, is the 
person enjoying this safe-conduct in dār al-ʾislām (Khadduri, 1966: 47). 
This essay aims to scrutinise this established interpretation of ʾamān in the siyar. This 
will be done in five parts. A first section discusses whether ʾamān entails obligations for 
both the person granting it and the person receiving it or only one of them, so as to see if it 
is more like a contract or a promise. This section is concluded with an explanation of so 
called conditional ʾamān. A second section discusses the agents of ʾamān, i.e. who could 
grant ʾamān. A third section, by far the longest, investigates the two terms mustaʾmin and 
ʾāmin, which are both derived from the root ʾa-ma-na. The section finds that the translation 
by Khadduri in fact has overlooked important distinctions between the two terms. A fourth 
section discusses the temporary nature of ʾamān and its relation to more permanent 
instruments of Islamic international law.
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3.3.2 ʾAmān as contract or promise
Throughout the introduction to the Arabic version of Al-Shaybānī's siyar, Khadduri clearly 
prefers to use ʾamān together with ʿahd (“contract, agreement”, so as to make ʿahd ʾamān), 
perhaps to clarify that it is some sort of contract or agreement that is referred to (Khadduri,
1975). Yet neither Al-Shaybānī nor Al-Sarakhsī seem to have had any restraints in using 
ʾamān by itself. Perhaps, Khadduri considers ʾamān, written on its own, to be unilateral, i.e.
a promise, or pledge, of security, and thought that he needed to compliment it with the 
word ʿahd in order to clarify that in some situations, the ʾamān is bilateral, i.e. more like a 
contract, which carries with it obligations to both parties. In the following, an attempt is 
made to clarify whether the ʾamān was unilateral or bilateral in the siyar with the help of 
excerpts from Al-Shaybānī's and Al-Sarakhsī's texts.
The following excerpt can be found on page 196 of the Arabic version of Al-siyar:
 اوباصأف نيملسملا راد ىلع اوراغا اذا نونمأتسملا نوملسملا مهيف نيذلا برحلا لهأ تيأرأ
 نيملسملا كئلوأ ىلع مهب اورمف برحلا راد مهولخداف نيملسم ارارحأ ةريبك ايابسو مئانغ
؟نيملسملا يرارذ ىلع اولتاقيو مهدهع اوضقني نأ مهل ىرتأ ،نينمأتسملا
(Al-Shaybānī, 196)
What do you think about the people of the realm of war, among whom are 
Muslims seeking protection (al-muslimūn al-mustaʾminūn), if they attacked
the realm of Islam and took bounty and many captives from the free 
Muslims, then brought them to the realm of war and passed by those 
Muslims seeking protection, do you think that they ought to renounce their 
protection (ʿahdahum) and fight to free the children and women of the 
Muslims?
It should be noted, that the translation of the word ʿahd (دم هس ع ), which occurs here in the 
form of ʿahdahum (مه د هس ع ), as “contract [of protection]” rests on the hypothesis that the 
word ʿahd is used by Al-Shaybānī to refer to the ʾamān, under which the Muslims in the 
text are protected and can travel freely in the realm of war. This relation between ʿahd and 
ʾamān could help us explain whetherʾamān is unilateral or bilateral. Lane (entry: ʿahd) 
states that ʿahd means a “compact, a contract, a covenant, an agreement, a confederacy, a 
league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, an obligation, or a promise”. Some of these are 
one-sided, such as obligation and promise, while others, such as compact, contract and 
agreement, consist of at least two parties. We cannot conclude from this excerpt whether 
Al-Shaybānī by ʾamān means a contract between the Muslims and the people of war, a 
promise by the people of war to not harm the Muslims, or an obligation on the Muslims to 
behave peacefully in the realm of war. It does show, however, that ʾamān in the siyar was 
not restricted to safe-conduct given to people from the realm of war travelling in Muslim 
lands, but also could be given to Muslim travellers.
In the following examples from the source texts, ʾamān is used as a synonym to the word
ʿaqd. It is clear from the dictionaries, including Lane (Entry: ʿaqd), Wehr (Entry: ʿa-qa-da),
Lisān al-ʿarab (Entry: ʿa-qa-da), al-Mawrid (Entry: ʿaqd) that the word ʿaqd has had the 
meaning 'contract' or 'agreement' since classical times. However, it not only has this 
bilateral meaning, but also a meaning more related to ḍamān, i.e. “[r]esponsibility, 
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accountableness, or suretiship” (Lane), which is unilateral. Yusuf Ali in his translation of 
the Qur'an (1946: 238) translates ʿaqd as 'obligation' and explains that it includes everything
from a believer's obligations to God and promises made unilaterally, as well as commercial 
contracts and contracts of marriage. 
In a chapter about the status of an ʾamān given by a ḏimmī, Al-Sarakhsī mentions a 
situation where the ḏimmī has been ordered by a Muslim to deliver a message of ʾamān to a
person from the realm of war. Where the ḏimmī delivers the message by telling the ḥarbī 
that “a person has granted you safe-conduct” (Al-Sarakhsī, 201), the ʾamān will be valid. In
the case where the ḏimmī instead chooses to say “I have granted you safe-conduct” (Al-
Sarakhsī, 201), the ʾamān would be invalid (bāṭil). The reason, Al-Sarakhsī writes, is that 
“this is not transmitting the message, but creation (ʾinšāʾ) of a contract or obligation (ʿaqd) 
by him, which pertains to himself (muḍāf ʾilā nafsih)”. Al-Sarakhsī continues by saying that
this particular ʾamān is invalid because a ḏimmī is not among the people capable of making
such contracts or obligations (Al-Sarakhsī, 201). 
Just like the term ʿahd, it is unclear whether ʿaqd is rightly translated as 'contract' or as 
'obligation'. 
One chapter of Al-Sarakhsī's commentary bears the title 'conditional ʾamān' (ʾamān ʿalā
š-šarṭ). The following passage occurs in the text:
لح يف مهف مهناخ نإف ،مهنوخي لو اذك ىلع مهلدي نأ ىلع لا جر نوملسملا نمآ اذإو :لاق
مل وأ ،مهناخ مث ،مهيديأ يف راص ىتح كلذ ىلع هنصح وأ هتنيدم نم مهيلع جرخف ،هلتق نم
هلتق ءاش نإ ماملا ىلإ هيف يأرلا راصو ،ةمذلا هنم تئرب دقف ،هتنايخ مهل تنابتساف مهلدي
دنع نوملسملا" :ملسلا هيلع لاقف ،مهنيب ىرج اذكه طرشلا نل ؛ اا ئيف هلعج ءاش نإو
هب ءافولا بجي :يأ ،كلمأ طرشلا هنع هللا يضر رمع لاقو ،"مهطورش
(Al-Sarakhsī, 195)
He (Al-Shaybānī) said: if the Muslims granted protection (ʾāmana or 
ʾammana, depending on the version of Al-Sarakhsī's text) to a man on [the 
condition] that he shows them [the way] to something and does not betray 
them, and if he betrays them then they are at liberty to kill him, so he exits 
with them from his city or fortress upon that [condition] so that he comes 
in their hands, then he betrays them, or does not show them [the way] and 
his betrayal becomes clear to them, then he becomes free of the protection 
and the decision whether he should be killed or made into booty lies with 
the imam; because this type of condition took place between them, and he 
(the Prophet, Muhammad) said, peace be upon him: “Muslims [stand by] 
their stipulations”, and Umar said, may God be pleased with him, “the 
condition/stipulation is expected of you”, that is: its fulfilment is required.
My hypothesis is that Al-Sarakhsī and Al-Shaybānī accepted an ʾamān as legally binding 
whether it was unilateral, i.e. made as a promise without conditions, or bilateral, i.e. made 
as a contract between two parties. This is supported by the fact that Al-Sarakhsī accepted as
valid an ʾamān made upon a condition.
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3.3.3 The agents of amānʾ
On page 175-178 in Al-Sarakhsī's commentary, the author discusses who is qualified to 
grant ʾamān. This discussion is an interesting example both of ixtilāf, i.e. accepted 
differences in opinion between the legal scholars, and of some legal methods used by such 
scholars. Al-Sarakhsī begins by quoting Al-Shaybānī, stating that: 
اا قساف وأ ناك لا دع مهلك ملسلا لهأ ىلع زئاج ملسملا رحلا لجرلا نامأ مث 
(Al-Sarakhsī, 175)
“Also, the ʾamān of the free Muslim man is valid to the whole community 
of Islam, whether he [i.e. the one granting ʾamān] is righteous or nefarious”
(My translation).
About the capacity of free Muslim women to give ʾamān, Al-Sarakhsī writes that their 
ʾamān is valid, even though they do not have the capacity or physical composition to 
partake in battle. He supports this through the use of a ḥadīṯ:
ابأ اهجوز تراجأ ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص هللا لوسر تنب بنيز نأ اهنامأ ةحص ىلع ليلدلاو
ترجأ :تلاق ئناه مأ نعو ،اهنامأ ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص هللا لوسر زاجأف ،عيبرلا نب صاعلا
تلغتف هنع هللا يضر بلاط يبأ نب يلع لخدف نيبيرق يأ ،نيكرشملا نم يل نيومح
ىتح امهلتقت ل هللاو :تلقف ?نيكرشملا نيريجتأ :لاقو ةأجف امهدصق يأ .امهلتقيل امهيلع
هللا ىلص هللا لوسر ىلإ تبهذف ،بابلا هنود اوقلغأ :تلقو تجرخ مث ،امهلبق يب أدبت
،يلع يمأ نبا نم تيقل اذام :تلقف ةمطاف تدجوو هدجأ ملف ،ةينثلا فسأ يف ملسو هيلع
ىلإ ،اهجوز نم يلع دشأ تناكف ،امهلتقيل امهيلع تلفتف نيكرشملا نم يل نيومح ترجأ
،هتخاف ئناه مأب اا بحرم :لاقف ،رابغلا ةجهر هيلعو ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص هللا لوسر علط نأ
يل نيومح ترجأ ،هنم تلفنأ تدك ام ،يلع يمأ نبا نم تيقل اذام ،هللا لوسر اي :تلقف
نم انمأو ترجأ نم انرجأ دقف ،كلذ هل ناك ام :لاقف ،امهلتقيل امهيلع تلفتف نيكرشملا نم
،ةكم حتف ىحض كلذو [...]لستغاف لا سغ هل تبكسف اهنع هللا يضر ةمطاف رمأ مث ،تنمأ
امهل ضرعتي نأ يلعل ناك ام هنأ نيبو ،اهنامأ ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص هللا لوسر ححص دقف
اهنامأ دعب: 
And the proof of the soundness of her ʾamān is that Zainab, the daughter 
of the Prophet (pbuh) protected (ʾajārat) her husband Abū l-ʿĀṣ bin al-
Rabīʿ, and the Prophet of God (pbuh) approved her ʾamān, and from [i.e. 
following the narration of] Umm Hani she said: I have protected (ʾajartu) 
two of my husband's people who are unbelievers, that is relatives, but Ali 
bin Abi Talib – may God be pleased with him – seized upon them both to 
slay them – that is he headed for them suddenly – and he said: Do you 
protect (ʾatujīrīna) the unbelievers? And I said: By God do not kill them 
two but begin with me before them, then I exited and said: lock the door 
for him, and I went to the Prophet of God (pbuh) in the lowest part of the 
mountain, but I did not find him but instead found Fatima and I said: what 
do you think about Ibn ʾummī Ali, I protected (ʾajartu) two of my 
husband's people, who are unbelievers, and he seized upon them both, and 
she was almost driven away by her husband, until the Prophet appeared, 
upon him dust was raised, and He said: Welcome Umm Hani, his sister, 
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and I said: Oh Prophet of God, what do you think of Ibn ʾummī Ali, I was 
almost driven away by him, I protected (ʾajartu) two of my husband's 
people of the unbelievers then he seized upon them to kill them both, and 
He said: that was not up to him, we protect (ʾajarnā) whomever she has 
protected (ʾajarat) and we give safe-conduct to (ʾammana) whomever she 
has given safe-conduct to (ʾammanat). Then he ordered Fatima, may God 
be pleased with her, and she poured a bath for him and he washed himself 
[…] and that morning he conquered Mekka, and the Prophet of God 
(pbuh) confirmed her ʾamān, and demonstrated that it was not up to Ali to 
confront them two after her ʾamān (My translation).
Slaves seem to have been permitted to grant ʾamān under certain conditions, but the 
following excerpt from Al-Sarakhsī shows that there was disagreement among the scholars:
 ىدحإ وهو هللا همحر ةفينح يبأ لوق اذهو ،لتاقي نوكي نأ لإ هل نامأ لف ملسملا دبعلا امأف
 هنامأ :هللا همحر دمحم لوق وهو ىرخلا ةياورلا يفو ،هللا همحر فسوي يبأ نع نيتياورلا
 ،لوقلاب ةرصن ناملاو ،هكلمي امب نيدلا ةرصن لهأ نم ملسم هنل ،لتاقي مل وأ لتاق حيحص
لاتقلا ةرشابم فلخب هل كولمم وهو،
As for the Muslim slave, no ʾamān for him unless he is fighting, and this is 
what has been said by Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him, and 
this is one of the two stories from Abū Yūsuf, may God have mercy upon 
him, and in the other story, and this said Muḥammad [Al-Shaybānī], may 
God have mercy upon him: His ʾamān is valid whether he fights or not, 
because he is a Muslim of the people who support the religion with what he
owns (or 'is allowed to do'), and the ʾamān is such support in speech, and 
this is a capacity [which is] separate from the practice of fighting (My 
translation).
 نوكي نمل لإ كلذ نيبتي لف روتسم ناملا يف ةرصنلا ىنعم :لوقي هللا همحر ةفينح ابأ نكل
 ةنامأ ةيريخلا رهظت لف ،لاتقلل كلام ريغ ىلوملا ةمدخب لوغشملا دبعلاو ،لاتقلل اا كلام
ىلوملا نذإب لا تاقم ناك اذإ ام فلخب
But Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him, says: the meaning of 
support in the ʾamān is hidden and thus does not reveal itself except to 
those who are capable of fighting, and the slave who is occupied with the 
service to his master is not capable of fighting, and so the benevolence of 
the faith does not show except if he fights with the permission of his master
… (My translation)
In the opinion of Al-Sarakhsī, ḏimmīs could not grant ʾamān.
Furthermore, Al-Sarakhsī did not accept an ʾamān granted by a Muslim who is captured
by non-Muslim fighters. Where a Muslim prisoner tells his captives he grants them ʾamān, 
the ʾamān is not binding upon other Muslims according to Al-Sarakhsī (and according to 
Al-Shaybānī, whose opinion he refers to), because the ʾamān is not granted with a view to 
benefit the Muslim community but rather to help the prisoner himself. This lack of 
communal interest means that the contract or obligation will be invalid.
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3.3.4 The protected and those seeking protection
Joseph Schacht writes that the mustaʾmin is “the person who has received an amān” 
(Encyclopaedia of Islam, Amān). Khadduri translates mustaʾmin as a [person] “under an 
amān” (Khadduri, 1966: 193). El-Bakry seems to agree with this definition (El-Bakry, 
1987: 311). Khadduri also says that a mustaʾmin is “a person who is clothed with security as
long as he remains in Islamic lands” (Khadduri, 1966: 18). A Muslim could, as we have 
seen above, be given the status of mustaʾmin in non-Islamic lands, making him “under 
obligation to respect the authority of that territory and observe its laws as long as he 
remained in that territory, enjoying the benefits of security granted him by a safe-conduct 
or a treaty with Muslim authorities. The Muslim was in the meantime under obligation to 
observe his own law, except perhaps certain rules not strictly obligatory in enemy territory” 
(Khadduri, 1966: 14).
My hypothesis about the term mustaʾmin differs from Khadduri's. For practical reasons, 
it is highly unlikely that traders, messengers and the like were always able to obtain an 
ʾamān before they entered dār al-ʾislām. This would have required meeting Muslims, 
preferably Muslims in positions of power, before every trade journey into Islamic lands, to 
be granted the ʾamān, and even if this could be arranged, the Muslims who granted ʾamān 
might not be on their way back to Muslim-controlled territory to inform officials there 
about their granting ʾamān to these specific non-Muslim travellers, making the journey 
ridden with the risk of being attacked by other Muslims unaware of the ʾamān. Therefore, it
seems logical that many travellers in fact moved freely between territories and sought 
ʾamān first when meeting officials at their destination in dār al-ʾislām. That this is not 
compatible with Khadduri's view of how an ʾamān was granted is implicit from how 
Khadduri states that “[i]nhabitants of the realm of war who entered into a peace treaty with
the Muslims did not need to obtain an ʾamān before entering the realm of Islam (Khadduri,
1966: 48). The important point here is that the statement indicates that Khadduri takes for 
granted that the normal procedure, i.e. when no peace treaty had been agreed, was that non-
Muslim traders asked for and obtained ʾamān before they entered dār al-ʾislām, most likely 
a cumbersome and perhaps dangerous task.
This theory of how an ʾamān was obtained makes it reasonable to search for a term 
conveying the state of such travellers, i.e. coming not under an ʾamān but in search for one. 
It is important for this theory that we look back on the dual meanings of the root ʾa-ma-na 
as outlined above (section 3.2). Travellers who have not yet been granted ʾamān (as in 
'protection)' come, obviously, in a state of trust and confidence, convinced that once at their
destination, they will be given protection. If it was not so, surely no non-Muslim trader 
would take the risk of entering dār al-islām no matter the potential profit.
The word mustaʾmin is the active participle of the tenth verb form of the root ʾa-ma-na. 
The tenth verb form of the Arabic verb commonly has the meaning of asking for something
or seeking something (Wightwick & Gaafar, 2008: 57). In the words of Schramm (1962: 
362), it is “desiderative” in meaning. This is so both in modern and classical Arabic. (Even 
if several examples exist of the tenth verb form carrying a meaning of a received status, 
such as mustaʾjir, 'tenant', or istatamma 'to be complete', they seem to be exceptions and the
general tendency is that form ten is desiderative.) The primary places to search for a term 
for travellers who seek protection is therefore in form ten of the root verb ʾa-ma-na, i.e. in 
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the form istaʾman and mustaʾmin.
The term ʾāmin is the active participle of the verb ʾamana in its first form. The normal 
meaning of such a participle is someone doing the act conveyed by the verb, or in case the 
verb means to be in a certain state, the one being in that state. Following this and the root 
meaning explained above, ʾāmin should have the meaning 'the one being secure and safe'. 
My hypothesis is thus that the place to look for a term for the person actually under an 
ʾamān is in the term ʾāmin. This hypothesis finds support in the dictionaries. Lane writes 
that ʾāmin, at least partly, carries the same meaning as the related ʾamīn. Both mean 
“[s]ecure, safe, or free from fear” (Lane, entry: ʾamīn). In the Qur'an, ʾamīn occurs in sūra 
95, where Mekka is referred to as “this city of security” (Yusuf ʿAli, sura 95).
A few examples from the source texts will now be analysed to determine the correct 
meaning of ʾāmin and mustaʾmin in classical Islamic international law. The first is from 
kitāb al-aṣl:
 ملسلا راد ىلا ةراجت يف انمأتسم جرخي برحلا لها نم نمأتسملا لجرلا تيأرا :تلق
؟دبعلا كلذ لاح ام ،برحلا ضرا يف هب لخدي مث املسم ادبع يرتشيف
(Al-Shaybānī, 168)
Khadduri's translation of this excerpt goes as follows: 
I asked: If a musta'min from among the inhabitants of the territory of war 
enters the territory of Islam under an amān of trade and purchases a 
Muslim slave and thereafter returns with the slave to the territory of war, 
what would the status of the slave be? (Khadduri, 1966: 160)
Khadduri chooses not to translate the first occurrence of the word mustaʾmin, and to 
translate the second occurrence, which is followed by fī tijāratin (ةة راجت يف), with “under an 
amān of trade”. 
Is it possible that Al-Shaybānī, in writing this sentence, could have been referring not 
to a trader under ʾamān but a traveller seeking ʾamān in order to trade safely? 
Contextually, such an interpretation seems possible, because there is nothing in the 
sentence that indicates that the man has already been granted protection when beginning 
his journey. The following translation, which follows the hypothesis that mustaʾmin refers 
to a traveller seeking safe-conduct, thus becomes possible:
I said: What do you think when a man who seeks protection exits from the 
realm of war to the realm of Islam to trade, seeking protection, and buys a 
Muslim slave with whom he enters the realm of war, what is the status of 
that slave? (My translation)
The hypothesis must also be tested on the commentary by Al-Sarakhsī:
بلطأ تئج :هودجو نيح لاقف ،ةأرما وأ لا جر اودجو برحلا راد يف نيملسملا ركسع نأ ولو
رهاظلا نل ؛ كلذ يف قدصي لو ءيف وهف هيلع اومجه ىتح هب ملع مهل نكي مل نإف ناملا
نم لاحب اذه قيلي امنإو ،هيلع اومجه نأ ىلإ مهنم اا يفتخم ناك هنإف ،لوقي اميف هبذكي
قدصي لف ةكبشلا يف عقو امدعب ةليلحلا هذه لاتحي هنأ رهاظلاف ،اا نمأتسم ل اا ريغم مهيتأي
ناملا بلطأ تئج ينإ هلوق لبقي لو ،هلتقي نأ مامللو ،ءيف وهف [...]
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(Al-Sarakhsī, 205)
If the Muslim army in the realm of war find a man or a woman, who when 
they find him says: I came to seek protection (al-ʾamān) and if he did not 
have knowledge of it until they captured him, then he is booty and does not
speak the truth about this: because it is clear that he is lying in what he 
says, and if he was hidden from them until they captured him, however it is
fitting to the situation that he came to them as one who is prone to change 
and not to seek protection (mustaʾminan), then it is evident that he achieved
this solution by tricks after he fell into the snare and should not be trusted, 
and […] he becomes booty, and it is for the Imam to kill him, and his talk 
that I came to demand protection (ʾamān) is not accepted (My translation).
Here, it is unreasonable to translate mustaʾmin with 'under safe-conduct' like Khadduri has 
done, because the enemy is not granted safe-conduct at all if he tries to fool the Muslims in 
order to save his life and avoid capture. Al-Sarakhsī continues:
 مل نإو ةليحلا هذهب لاتحا كلذ نم نكمتي مل نيحف نيملسملا دصقل اا دار لبقأ هنأ رهاظلاف
ليلد مهيلإ هلابقإ نل ؛ نمآ وهف مهاتأ ىتح مهيلإ لبقأف رسأ لو لتقب نوملسملا هل ضرعي
لولا فلخب ناملاب ءادنلا ةلزنمب وهف ،ةملاسملا
(Al-Sarakhsī, 205)
… it is evident that he approached as an answer to the Muslims' intention 
and when he did not succeed he invented this trick, and if the Muslims did 
not deal with him by killing [him] and did not make him a prisoner of war, 
then he approached them in order to come to them, and so he is under 
protection (ʾāmin); because approaching them is evidence of his peaceful 
intentions and equal to a call for protection (ʾamān) contrary to the first 
[case].
Here, the fighter is granted safe-conduct, and therefore, Al-Sarakhsī switches from using 
the term mustaʾmin to the term ʾāmin. This supports the theory that mustaʾmin should be 
interpreted as 'seeking safe-conduct or protection' and not as already 'under protection'. It is
however still possible that Al-Sarakhsī uses the word ʾāmin simply in its general meaning, 
i.e. 'safe' and not in a legal-technical meaning to indicate the person's legal status. The 
following quote however provides further evidence that the terms mustaʾmin and ʾāmin were
indeed directly contrasted to each other as legal-technical terms:
 سيل عضوملا كلذ نم طحناف ،هنوري لو هملك نوملسملا عمسي ل ثيح ةعنم يف ناك نإو
كلذ يف وهو ناملاب ىدان مهعمسي ثيح ناك املف ،نيملسملا ىتأ ىتح حلس لو دحأ هعم
ةعنملا ةقرافم نم هعسو يف امب ىتأ هنل ؛ نمآ وهف ،نيملسملا نم عنتمم ريغ عضوملا
،ناملل اا بلاط ءاج هنأ رهاظلاف ،حلسلا ىقلأو ،نوملسملا عمسي ثيحب ناك ذإ ناملاب ءادنلاو
نيكرشملا نم دحأ نإو" :ىلاعت لاق ،هلثم نمأ عرشلا نل ،اونمؤي مل وأ اونمأ ،نمآ وهف
:ةبوتلا "هرجأف كراجتسا6:لافنلا"اهل حنجاف ملسلل اوحنج نإو":ىلاعت لاقو ،61
(Al-Sarakhsī, 205f.)
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And if he was in an inaccessible place where the Muslims did not hear him 
talking and did not see him, and he came down from that place without 
anybody and without weapon in order to come to the Muslims, and he 
called for protection (ʾamān) when he was where they could hear him and 
he is in that place not constrained by the Muslims, then he is under 
protection (ʾāmin); because he did all in his power to depart from that 
inaccessible place and call for protection (ʾamān) when he was where the 
Muslims could hear him, and threw his weapon, and it is clear that he came
to demand protection (ʾamān), then he is protected (ʾāmin), whether they 
granted protection (ʾammanū) or not (lam yuʾamminū), because the divine 
law grants protection to those like him, He – the Exalted – said: “And if 
any one of the polytheists seeks your protection  (stajāraka), then grant him
protection (fa-ʾajirhu)” Al-Tawba: 6, and He – the Exalted – said: “And if 
they incline to peace, then incline to it [also]” Al-ʾAnfāl: 61 (My 
translation, verses from the Qur'an translated by Sahih International).
Not only does this excerpt give yet another example of how Al-Sarakhsī prefers the term 
ʾāmin when the state of the enemy has been established. It is also important to note that in 
the first of the two Qur'anic verses, verb form ten of the root ja-wa-ra (stajāraka) means 'to
seek protection', i.e. it carries the desiderative meaning that mustaʾmin potentially carries as
well. This gives further weight to the argument that mustaʾmin means 'to seek safe-conduct'.
The following example shows that where the enemy comes to the Muslims on other 
preconditions he may not be given ʾamān: 
اا عنتمم نوكي ل عضوم يف ناك املف ،نيملسملا وحن هحمر اا دام هفيس لا اس لبقأ ناك نإو
لا تاقم لبقأ هنأ هلاح نم رهاظلا نل ؛ ءيف وهف ناملا ىدان مهنم
(Al-Sarakhsī, 205f.)
And if he approached with his sword drawn and his spear pointed forward 
towards the Muslims, and when he is in a place where he is not constrained 
by them he calls for protection (ʾamān) then he is booty; because it is clear 
from his state that he approached them as a combatant (My translation).
In the following, a few instances where Al-Shaybānī uses the term ʾāmin will be analysed. 
In the first example, Al-Shaybānī has spoken about the conditions on which traders could 
enter the dār al-ʾislām. He then says: 
؟مهل تناك يتلا ةعداوملا لا ناما ريغب رجات ملسلا راد ىلا مهنم لخد نا تيارا :تلق
ةعداوملا كلتب نمآ وه :لاق.
(Al-Shaybānī, 166)
This, Khadduri translates as follows: 
I asked: If one of them entered the territory of Islam as a merchant without
an amān, except the peace agreement they had made [with the Muslims, 
what would be the ruling]?
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He replied: He would enjoy an amān by virtue of that agreement. 
(Khadduri, 1966: 157).
Khadduri's translation in this case thus follows my hypothesis in that he considers ʾāmin to
be a person enjoying ʾamān.
 يأب مهتاوصأ اوعمس اذإ ،اا عيمج نونمآ مهف ناملاب برحلا لهأ نوملسملا ىدان اذإو :لاق
هب مهودان ناسل
(Al-Sarakhsī, 199)
He (Al-Shaybānī) said: if the Muslims shout anʾamān to the people of war 
then they are all protected (ʾāminūn), if they heard their voices, in 
whichever language they shouted (my translation).
This is one instance where it is unlikely that Al-Sarakhsī used the word ʾāmin as a non-
technical term with the general meaning 'safe', because it is written as the direct result of 
the Muslims' ʾamān. It is also a good example of a unilateral ʾamān, because the only 
requirement for the ʾamān to be valid is that it is heard, and there is no condition that the 
people of war reply with an acceptance of the ʾamān. This applies no matter what language 
the Muslims speak or how they express their promise:
 اذه هبشت ةملك وأ ،كيلع سأب ل وأ ،فخت ل وأ ،نمآ تنأ :يبرحلل نوملسملا لاق اذإو :لاق
نامأ هلك وهف
(Al-Sarakhsī, 200)
He (Al-Shaybānī) said: if the Muslims said to the enemy: you are protected
(ʾāmin), or do not fear, or no harm [will come] to you, or a word that 
resembles this, then it is all ʾamān (my translation).
 ينأ نايب هيف ءامسلا ىلإ عباصلاب هتراشإ كلذكو ةقفاوم ملكف اا قلطم ،لاعت :هلوق امأف
كتنمأ :هلوق ةلزنمب وهف ،ءامسلا بر قحب ينم نمآ تنأ وأ ،ءامسلا هلإ ةمذ كتيطعأ
(Al-Sarakhsī, 200)
And as for him (the Muslim) saying: come, without any exception then 
[his] speech is analogous [to the mentioned ways of granting ʾamān], and 
so is him pointing with his fingers to the sky; in this there is a message that 
I have given you the protection of the God of the sky, or you are safe from 
me in the name of the Lord of the sky, and this is a substitute for him 
saying: I have granted you protection (ʾammantuka) (my translation).
Here, it is even clearer that ʾāmin refers to an enemy ḥarbī who is protected by the ʾamān. 
This is because the three phrases 'you are protected', 'do not fear' and 'no harm will come 
to you'  all refer to things said by the Muslims, who are the protectors. The fact that the 
term mustaʾmin is not used in either of the two excerpts further indicates that it has the 
meaning 'seeking protection' as posited above, and not 'under protection'.
انونمأ ،اهلهأ نم موق مهادانف اهيلع اوماقأف نصح وأ ةرومطم ىلإ نيملسملا ركسع ىهتنا اذاو
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كلذ اولأس نيذلا موقلاف ،مهل اهوحتفو كلذ اولعفف ،مكل اهحتفن نأ ىلع انعاتمو انيلهأ ىلع
ءيشب مهسفنأ اوركذي مل نإو نونمآ
(Al-Sarakhsī, 217)
And if the army of the Muslims came upon a house or a fortress, and 
attacked it, and people of its inhabitants called them – protect our people 
and our property upon [the condition] that we open it for you, and they did 
that and they opened it for them, then the people who asked that are 
protected (ʾāminūn) even if they did not say anything themselves (my 
translation.)
Here, Al-Sarakhsī states that if the people inside the fortress open their gates they become 
protected (ʾāminūn). This shows that Al-Sarakhsī does not use the term mustaʾmin when the
legal status of the protected people is not in question. It is clear to him that in this case, the 
people of war have a right to receive protection.
In the following example, the term ʾāmin is instead used in contrast to the word fayʾ, 
which means booty, i.e. property captured in war.
قدم ص نإف ،يلهأ نم اذه :امهنم دحاو لك لاقف ،مهنم نلجر يبسلا ضعب ىعدم ا نإو
يذلا ببسلا نل ؛ اا ئيف ناك اا عيمج امهبذك نإو ،اا نمآ ناكو هلهأ نم وهف امهدحأ هب يعدم ملا
امهنم دحاو نيبو هنيب تبثي مل ناملا هيلع انبتر
(Al-Sarakhsī, 218)
And if two of their men claim [ownership, relationship to] some prisoner 
of war, and both of them say: this one belongs to my family, and if the one 
who is claimed agrees with one of them then he is of his family and is 
protected (ʾāmin), and if he denies them both he is booty (fayʾ); because 
the reason upon which we founded the protection (ʾamān) did not become 
established between him and one of the two of them (my translation).
Again in the following excerpt, the term ʾāmin is used in contrast to fayʾ (booty), but here, 
we may also note the use of the term mustaʾmin. The situation which is discussed is similar 
to the previous one in that it is after a battle and the Muslims are dividing the spoils of war. 
Some of the captured people claim that they belong to the same family so that if one of 
them is granted ʾamān the other should too:
نمأتسملا ىعدم ا وأ نمأتسملا هبذكو كلذ ىعدم ا مهيأو ،نينمآ اوناك كلذ ىلع اوقداصت اذإف
ءيف وهف يعدم ملا هبذكو
(Al-Sarakhsī, 219)
And if they are in agreement on this they are protected (ʾāminīn), and 
whichever of them claims that and the protection-seeker (mustaʾmin) 
disproves him or he claims the protection-seeker (mustaʾmin) and the 
claimer disproves it, then he is booty (fayʾ) (my translation)
This statement by Al-Sarakhsī is an example of how a mustaʾmin can become either booty 
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or ʾāmin depending on the circumstances. It lends further support to the hypothesis that 
mustaʾmin is the preferred term when a person is seeking protection but his legal status is 
not yet determined. 
3.3.5 The temporary nature of amānʾ
Bsoul (2008) argues that ʾamān is a temporary form of the ʿaqd al-ḏimma, i.e. the compact 
under which non-Muslims could live in Islamic lands permanently and enjoy certain rights 
and freedoms. An-Na'im (1987: 329) also highlights the temporary nature of the ʾamān 
(An-Na'im, 1987: 329). Khadduri explains that if the mustaʾmin “[s]hould decide to remain
for a longer span, he would be required to become a Dhimmī and pay a poll tax as non-
Muslim subject of the Islamic state. Dhimmīs ... were originally inhabitants of occupied 
territories who agreed to pay the jizya (poll tax) and to observe certain rules embodied in 
peace agreements made after they passed under Islamic rule” (Khadduri, 1966: 47).
The relation between ʾamān and ḏimmiyya is touched upon by Al-Sarakhsī in the 
following passage, which is part of a chapter named 'Chapter on the woman from the 
people of war who exits with a Muslim man who says: I have captured her, and she says: I 
came seeking protection (mustaʾmina)' (p. 235). Al-Sarakhsī discusses a situation where a 
Muslim man comes from the realm of war, perhaps having fled from captivity among the 
enemies, and brings with him a woman who he says is his wife but meets other Muslims 
who seek to capture the woman. Al-Sarakhsī argues that:
دقف امهنيب يذلا حاكنلا ىلع ءانب اهب جرخ نيح هنل ؛ ةيمذ ةرح تناك حاكنلا تبث اذإو
يه مث مهتعامج نامأك برحلا لهأ رهق نم جرخ امدعب نيملسملا نم دحاولا نامأو ،اهنمأ
اا عبت انراد لهأ نم يه ريصتف انراد يف ةنمأتسملا ةلزنمب ةيمذ ريصتف ،ملسم تحت ةنمأتسم
هل
(Al-Sarakhsī, 235)
If the marriage is established she is a free ḏimmīya; because, based on the 
marriage between them, when he exited with her he granted her protection 
(ʾammanahā), and the protection (ʾamān) of one Muslim after he left the 
captivity of the enemies is like the protection (ʾamān) of them all, [so that] 
thereafter she is a protection-seeker (mustaʾmina) under the Muslim, and 
she becomes a ḏimmīya in the position of (bi-manzilati) a protection-seeker
(mustaʾmina) in our territory and following this she becomes one of our 
people (my translation).
The result of this reasoning is thus similar to Khadduri's conclusion. The woman indeed 
becomes a ḏimmīya if her relationship with the Muslim is established. Because of the 
phrasing of Al-Sarakhsī's original, it has not been possible to conclusively say whether the 
woman loses her status as mustaʾmina when she becomes a ḏimmīya or whether there is a 
more complicated relation between the concepts ʾamān and ḏimmīya, so that she could 
retain both statuses in Islamic lands. This depends on the meaning of bi-manzilati (ةلزنمب), 
which has been translated as 'in the position of' but whose exact legal meaning would need 
further investigation. That the woman loses her status as a mustaʾmina (or ʾāmina, if her 
status as protected has been conclusively established, see previous section) would however 
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be in line with the view among scholars that ʾamān is only temporary.
As a side-note,ʾamān is a temporary institution in a second sense, because it relies on 
dividing the world in the way the classical scholars did, into the realms of war, peace and 
truce. As El-Bakry explains, there will be no need for ʾamān, or for siyar as a field of law, 
if the whole world is dār al-ʾislām (El-Bakry, 1987: 121).
4 Conclusion
Concepts related to ʾamān have been a part of Arabic legal discourse already since the 
foundation of the Islamic religion in the 7th century A.D. This essay has sought to show 
that ʾamān was a legal tool used to decrease the number of hostile encounters with the 
outside world and facilitate trade. Even though the world was divided according to the 
jurists into a realm of war and a realm of Islam, there was not necessarily any ever-present 
violence between the two.
We have seen (in chapters 2.2 and 2.3) how the law at the time of Al-Shaybānī and Al-
Sarakhsī constantly developed through re-interpretation. This re-interpretation took place 
with the use of legal methods and principles together with vivid intellectual effort. In the 
analysed materials, we can see how Al-Sarakhsī discusses the views of Al-Shaybānī and his 
predecessors in relation to the sources of law, to eventually find a solution which in some 
cases is not in agreement with that of the previous scholars. In the material analysed in this 
essay, several examples of qiyās and istiḥsān have been shown. Ixtilāf, the differences in 
opinion in the scholarly community, was definitely an accepted and even encouraged 
phenomenon and opinions do not seem to have been in any way streamlined.
Both Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī seem to have afforded great importance to this in the 
context of ʾamān. This must certainly have rested on the great respect given to contracts 
and obligations in general in the Qur'an and Sunna. It is also possible that it was the sanctity
of contracts that made Al-Shaybānī protest when the ʾamān of the zaydi imam was 
questioned by the caliph shortly before Al-Shaybānī's death.
That ʾamān is an intricate subject was noted by Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī. Therefore,
the authors and translators who have chosen not to translate it and its related terms clearly 
take a big risk of missing information contained in the word. It has been demonstrated that 
ʾamān as an Arabic root contains two meanings, one related to trust and one related to 
safety. This creates further difficulties when translating its derived terms.
Some conclusions could be drawn on whether ʾamān at the time of the classical jurists 
was an agreement between two parties or whether it was a promise by the 'protector' to give
safety to the 'protected'. The most important indicator that ʾamān was a contract rather than
an unconditional promise is the fact that Al-Sarakhsī writes about conditional ʾamān. The 
instances in the source texts where ʾamān was connected to or used as a synonym with the 
words ʿahd and ʿaqd, which in modern Arabic mean 'contract' rather than 'promise', could 
not show that ʾamān meant contract, because both words also had the meaning 'obligation' 
during classical times.
Al-Sarakhsī permitted both women and men, if they were free and Muslims, to grant 
ʾamān to non-Muslims in dār al-ʾislām. Women, he wrote, forward the aims of Islam in 
other ways than fighting, which is what previous scholars had considered to give the Muslim
men their legal capacity to grant ʾamān. In general, Al-Sarakhsī seems to have stressed the 
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free will of the individual as a prerequisite for granting ʾamān, rather than for instance 
gender or status within the Muslim community. It is the free advancement of the interest of 
Islam and the Islamic community which is required for an ʾamān to be valid. This is 
perhaps the reason a ḏimmī cannot legally grant ʾamān. Similarly, a Muslim man who has 
been captured by the enemy cannot grant his captors ʾamān because such an ʾamān would 
clearly only benefit him individually, not the community as a whole. Consequently, the rest 
of the community is not bound by the ʾamān given by a ḏimmī or a captured Muslim. Free 
will is required also in the applying for ʾamān. The enemy ḥarbī who seeks ʾamān only 
when he is in the hands of the Muslims is not considered to have the right to protection and 
the Muslims are not obliged to grant him ʾamān. 
This essay has also critically evaluated Majid Khadduri's translation of the word 
mustaʾmin as “a person who is clothed with security as long as he remains in Islamic lands” 
(Khadduri, 1966: 18). It has been demonstrated that it is more likely that mustaʾmin 
referred to a traveller applying for ʾamān than one already under ʾamān. This is for the 
following reasons: to take for granted that traders had to seek ʾamān before they arrived in 
Muslim lands would be to underestimate the flow of trade between lands at the time. It 
would also be to adopt a view of Islam as inherently violent, because to require traders to 
seek ʾamān before they entered Islamic territory would mean that traders not given ʾamān 
beforehand were constantly insecure in Islamic lands. It is also my view to confuse the 
terms mustaʾmin and ʾāmin would also be to underestimate the precision of classical Arabic 
as a legal language. Moreover, there are indications in Al-Sarakhsī's text that Muslims were 
not only able to but also obliged to give ʾamān when certain conditions were met, such as 
when a man approached them without weapons. In those cases, Al-Sarakhsī uses the term 
ʾāmin instead of mustaʾmin. Interestingly, a person who approaches the Muslims in that 
manner is characterised by the second meaning of the root ʾa-ma-na, that of trust and 
confidence, rather than security. The theory is also supported by the theoretical basis of the 
Arabic root system, because the form mustaʾmin belongs to form ten, which is commonly 
desiderative in meaning. To translate mustaʾmin with 'seeking protection/ʾamān' is also 
contextually possible in the excerpts analysed, and it is contextually unreasonable in some 
of the cases analysed to translate it with 'under ʾamān' or 'protected', such as when a 
mustaʾmin approaches the Muslims to ask for ʾamān but is instead taken as booty. It has 
also been shown that Al-Shaybānī and Al-Sarakhsī considered Muslims in non-Islamic 
lands to be able to be granted protection as well, in contrast to Khadduri's explanation of 
the term mustaʾmin.
Some modern scholars of Islamic law consider ʾamān to be one aspect of the ḏimmiyya, 
i.e. the protection given to non-Muslim resident in Islamic lands in exchange for taxes. It 
has been demonstrated that such a view is compatible with Al-Sarakhsī's view on the 
relation between ʾamān and ḏimmiyya, as he writes that a non-Muslim woman who is 
brought to Islamic land under an ʾaman becomes a ḏimmiya if she stays there permanently 
as the wife of a Muslim.
5 Final remarks
Lastly, it is tempting to point out the many similarities between the system of ʾamān in the 
siyar and the modern laws of travel and migration. It is for instance not too far-fetched to 
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see ʾamān as a form of visa. Visas are today a common way to apply and receive a permit 
to travel to a foreign country. The laws and regulations surrounding visas are of similar 
complexity as those related to ʾamān. Moreover, it is well-known that visa rules are the 
objects of changing political will, economic circumstances and diplomatic relations, so that 
the visa policy of one country towards another can change overnight. For instance, people 
from the European Union generally have little difficulty obtaining visas to countries in 
Africa and Asia, but many citizens from those two continents may not be allowed to travel 
legally to the EU and, if they do, must go through rigorous examination before eventually 
doing so. Even longer and more thorough procedures apply to the obtaining of a residence 
permit, i.e. the permit to stay and work in a foreign country for a longer time than the visa. 
One may possibly see the residence permit as a modern form of ḏimmīya.
It is also possible to argue that the complexity and constant variability of the migration 
rules may also tell us something about the concept of ʾamān. The world in Al-Shaybānī's 
and Al-Sarakhsī's time was of course very different to ours and the wave of global 
movement and networking that have followed what we call globalisation did not exist on 
today's global scale. Nevertheless, the social and economic incentives to travel or migrate 
permanently are likely to have existed. Two such incentives that we have touched upon in 
this essay are trade, another is the effects of war, which must have uprooted many people. 
Both factors contribute to modern global migration. Perhaps, the rules of ʾamān were 
affected by similar mechanisms then as migration is today. We have seen that scholars in 
general agree that Islamic law, i.e. at least the fiqh as distinct from the immutable shari'a, 
was an ever-changing, re-interpreted project already in the first years after the Prophet's 
death. As an important part of this law, ʾamān was most likely the object of similar 
constant re-interpretation. To leave such room for interpretation must have been important 
for the jurists of classical Islamic law, because the political sensitivity of the topic of 
migration was just as high as today. As an indicator of this political sensitivity we may point
out that Al-Shaybānī was dismissed from service as judge after a discussion on the 
interpretation of an instance of ʾamān. 
Combined together, this leads us to the paradoxical conclusion that the explanations of 
different aspects of ʾamān which have been presented in this essay may teach us about the 
system of Islamic law, the way the jurists thought about the system, as well as the political 
reality of that time. It is of less use, however, for drawing conclusions about the concept of 
ʾamān which could apply today if the concept were to be used as a modern tool of law. For 
future research, a study of such modern uses would be highly interesting.
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